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Needed: The Social-Scientific Lawyer
Kent M. Weeks*
T HE SIGNIFICANCE of the behavioral sciences for the lawyer, foreseen
by Justice Holmes in 1897-"For the rational study of the law the
black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics" i-is now
evident. Once confined to academic journals and considered irrelevant
to American law, the empirical findings of the behavioral sciences are
now the lawyer's tools. The Supreme Court not only accepts empirical
data of the social scientists in briefs, but implicitly seeks such data in
order to enable the court to make decisions.
Today, for example, the behavioral scientist is encouraged to pro-
duce information on prejudice, poverty, pre-trial investigation, police
practices, confessions, and jury behavior. For a decade the Chicago jury
project by the University of Chicago Law School, has conducted re-
search and published findings regarding jury behavior. Other studies
(including one by Cleveland-Marshall Law School) have contributed to
changes in the bail procedures employed in our courts, and are raising
the question of whether fines could be better punishment than incarcera-
tion for crimes presently involving short term imprisonments.
The introduction of sociological data in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion of Topeka,2 is well known. To support the conclusions, "Segregation
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educa-
tional and mental development of Negro children," and, "Separate edu-
cational facilities are inherently unequal," 3 Chief Justice Warren cites
in the famous footnote 11 not judicial authorities but sociologists and
psychologists, including K. B. Clark and Gunnar Myrdal.
The use of this kind of data has been cited with favor, "There, by
placing before the Court authoritative scientific opinions regarding the
effect of racial classification and of "separate but equal" treatment, the
plaintiffs helped persuade the Court in the shaping of a judge-made rule
of law," 4 as well as criticism, ". . . in the long history of this country
there has never before been a time when an Appellate Court or Supreme
Court of the United States relied solely and alone on scientific authority
*Of the Ohio Bar, Ass't. Prof. of Political Science, College of Wooster (Ohio).
0 . W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 187 (1920).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Id. at 494, 495. The first quotation represents a finding made by the Kansas court
which was accepted by the Supreme Court.
4 Greenberg, Social Scientists Take the Stand: A Review and Appraisal of Their
Testimony in Litigation, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 954 (1956).
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to sustain a legal decision." 5 The crucial fact, however, is that the Su-
preme Court is using such scientific data.
If public policy is involved in judicial opinions, as Justice Holmes
has observed-"Every important principle which is developed by litiga-
tion is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely under-
stood views of public policy . . ." 6-then the courts and lawyers appear-
ing before the courts should have as much information as possible re-
lating to the public and to policy.
Certain members of the Supreme Court not only have utilized data
from the behavioral sciences, but have decried the lack of data relevant
to certain issues. Justice White, dissenting in Estes v. Texas,7 raises the
question of the relationship of the communications media and a fair trial.
"In my view, the currently available materials assessing the effect of
cameras in the courtroom are too sparse and fragmentary to constitute
the basis for a constitutional judgment permanently barring any and all
forms of television coverage," 8 and voices concern that the Court,
"... in effect precludes further opportunity for intelligent assessment of
the probable hazards imposed by the use of cameras at criminal trials...
although our experience is inadequate and our judgment corresponding-
ly infirm, the Court discourages further meaningful study of the use of
television at criminal trials." 9
In Miranda v. Arizona,0 it is clear that the lack of conclusive evi-
dence regarding the question of confessions without counsel contributes
to the division on the Court. Dissenting are Justice Clark:
Since there is at this time a paucity of information and an almost
total lack of empirical knowledge on the practical operation of re-
quirements truly comparable to those announced by the majority,
I would be more restrained lest we go too far too fast,"
and Justice Harlan:
Evidence on the role of confessions is notoriously incomplete ...
We do know that some crimes cannot be solved without confessions,
that ample expert testimony attests to their importance in crime
control, and that the Court is taking a real risk with society's wel-
fare in imposing its new regime on the country. 2
5 Senator Eastland, The Supreme Court's Modern Scientific Authorities, in The
Segregation Cases, 4 (1955).
6 0. W. Holmes, Jr., Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 Amer. L. Rev. 630
(1879).
7 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Justice Brennan joined Justice White in dissent.
8 Id. at 616.
9 Ibid.
10 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11 Id. at 501.
12 Id. at 517. Justices Stewart and White joined Justice Harlan in dissent.
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But in the absence of full and complete information, Justice Warren,
who wrote the majority opinion in Miranda, and Justice Harlan dis-
agree in their interpretation of various investigative practices. Justice
Warren notes:
The practice of the FBI can readily be emulated by state and local
enforcement agencies. The argument that the FBI deals with differ-
ent crimes than are dealt with by state authorities does not mitigate
the significance of the FBI experience.13
However, Justice Harlan notes that,
... there is some basis for believing that the staple of FBI criminal
work differs importantly from much crime within the ken of local
police. The skill and resources of the FBI may also be unusual,14
and that ". . . in any event the FBI falls sensibly short of the Court's
formalistic rules." 15
Numerous questions involving quantifiable data were raised in this
dialogue between the Chief Justice and Justice Harlan. Are the types
of crimes handled by the FBI significantly different from crimes dealt
with by local police? What are the practices of the FBI? What different
skills and resources does the FBI have available to it? Are the practices
of the FBI transferable to local authorities?
On the question of the need for lawyers at all pre-trial identifica-
tions, Justice White cites the lack of empirical data and cries out for
research:
The Court apparently believes that improper police procedures are
so widespread that a broad prophylactic rule must be laid down,
requiring the presence of counsel at all pretrial identifications, in
order to detect recurring instances of police misconduct. I do not
share this perverse distrust of all official investigations. None of the
materials the Court relies upon supports it. Certainly I would bow
to solid fact, but the Court quite obviously does not have before it
any reliable, comprehensive survey of current police practices on
which to base its new rule. Until it does, the Court should avoid
excluding relevant evidence from state criminal trials. (Emphasis
added) 16
Again, members of the court have noted the lack of evidence re-
garding the question of the effect of pornography on human behavior.
Justice Harlan discusses the dilemma faced by judges:
Clearly the state legislature has made the judgment that the printed
words can "deprave or corrupt" the reader-that words can incite
13 Id. at 486.
14 Id. at 521, note 19.
15 Id. at 521.
16 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 251, 252 (1967). Justices Harlan and Stewart
joined Justice White who concurred in part and dissented in part. They concurred
in the holding that the Fifth Amendment was not applicable, but dissented from the
holding on the Sixth Amendment.
Sept. 1968
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to antisocial or immoral action.... It is well known, of course, that
the validity of this assumption is a matter of dispute among critics,
sociologists, psychiatrists, and penologists. There is a large school
of thought, particularly in the scientific community, which denies
any causal connection between the reading of pornography and im-
morality, crime, or delinquency. Others disagree.
1 7
Lacking evidence establishing such a "causal connection," should
the court sustain legislation regulating pornography? Justice Douglas,
again noting the lack of reliable information, thinks not:
The absence of dependable information on the effect of obscene lit-
erature on human conduct should make us wary. It should put us
on the side of protecting society's interest in literature, except and
unless it can be said that the particular publication has impact on
action that the government can control."8
Justice Douglas cites data from the Kinsey report, from studies of ex-
perts in the field of juvenile delinquency, and then, with tongue in cheek,
a survey reported in a reputable law review:
Yet the arousing of sexual thoughts and desires happens every day
in normal life in dozens of ways. Nearly 30 years ago a question-
naire sent to college and normal school women graduates asked what
things were most stimulating sexually. Of 409 replies, 9 said
"music"; 18 said "pictures"; 29 said "dancing"; 40 said "drama"; 95
said "books"; and 218 said "man." Alpert, Judicial Censorship of
Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 73.19
The use of data from the behavioral sciences is gaining recognition.
The voluminous reports from the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice (1967) as well as the Report
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) em-
ployed the empirical studies of social scientists and hired consultants
from the social sciences to aid them in formulating findings and con-
clusions.
This article has deliberately omitted discussion of research in the
area of judicial behavior-research concerned with why judges do what
they do. Nor does this article deal with moral and ethical problems, such
as the misuse of data and the invasion of privacy by researchers. Rather,
the intent has been to suggest that the courts are interested in and are
using the results of social research.
Since the Supreme Court, and to a lesser extent the lower courts,
have indicated a willingness to examine the data of the behavioral sci-
17 Alberts v. State of California, 354 U.S. 476, 501 (1957). Justice Harlan concurred
in Alberts, but dissented in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). These cases
were decided together.
18 Alberts v. State of California, supra note 18, at 511. Justice Black joined Justice
Douglas in dissent.
19 Id. at 509.
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ences, the lawyer must know how to find such information and will need
to be trained in the use of this data. A leading foundation, the Walter
E. Meyer Research Institute of Law, which supports legal research, has
observed from its own experience a gap between the law and the social
sciences; where legal research is concerned, non-lawyers ". . . need basic
training in the elements and methods of law," while lawyers ". . . need
substantial exposure to the methods and principles of survey research
and the management of quantitative data." 20 Law school curriculum is
changing as law schools recognize that lawyers need some facility in the
methodology of the behavioral sciences if the lawyers are to be able to
utilize the research of the data gatherers.
There is an additional problem for the lawyer, that of locating the
data. The Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law notes that although
there has been an accumulation ". . . of scientific evidence about how
human beings act and react in legally significant settings," these findings
have been little utilized.
Many of these findings or intimations may be of great use to the law;
but they are out of sight so far as the legal profession is concerned;
either because lawyers do not know they exist or are unaware of
their importance. A systematic audit of social science literature,
perhaps by a cross-disciplinary team, could produce an inventory of
findings that might significantly advance the fund of materials for
law improvement.2 1
The courts are making decisions which affect public policy, some-
times on the basis of empirical data offered in legal briefs, and at times
in the absence of such data. It should be evident that members of the
legal profession must have supportive data available to them and must
know how to use it. The legal profession and the behavioral sciences no
longer operate in mutually exclusive spheres.
20 Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law, Report for the Period July 1, 1964-
June 30, 1966, 15.
21 Id. at 15-16.
Sept. 1968
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1968
